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False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label
Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products
Stephanie Greene*
I. Introduction
The $400 billion pharmaceutical industry remains one of the most
profitable industries, even at a time when "health care" is inevitably
paired with "crisis." Despite its continued profitability, the industry has
faced challenges due to lack of innovation, patent expiration on
blockbuster drugs, and competition from generic manufacturers. In
response to such pressures, many manufacturers increased marketing
efforts in order to spur sales and create new markets for existing drugs.
From 1996 to 2001, pharmaceutical companies doubled the number of
sales representatives in the United States' and nearly doubled the amount
of money they spent on sales promotion. Most drug makers now spend
twice as much on marketing existing drugs as they do on researching
new ones.
3
In a 2000 study, the National Institute for Health Care Management
concluded that "more aggressive marketing of prescription drugs to both
doctors and consumers," is one of the factors contributing to the rise in
prescription drug spending. 4  While the advent of direct-to-consumer
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Carroll School of Management, Boston
College; Boston College, J.D., 1984; Princeton University, B.A., 1980.
1. American Medical Association, Module 4. American Medical Association
Ethical Guidelines on Gifts to Physicians from Industry, http://www.arna-
assn.org/ama/noindex/category/9984.html citing Chin T., American Medical News at
www.amednews.com, May 6, 2002 (sales representatives in the United States doubled
from some 87,000 in 1996).
2. Id. citing Gammage, J. & Stark, K., Under the Influence, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar.
9, 2002, (the industry spent $15.7 billion on promotion in 2001, up 43% from 1997).
3. See Gardiner Harris, Treatment by Incentive; As Doctor Writes Prescription,
Drug Company Writes a Check, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004, at 1. See generally MARCIA
ANGELL, M.D., THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE US AND
WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 37-51 (2004) (maintaining that the true cost of research and
development is substantially less than the drug companies claim).
4. See National Institute for Health Care Management, Prescription Drug
Expenditures in 2000: The Upward Trend Continues, available at
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advertising has bombarded the public with messages about how we can
be healthier, happier and sexier, the $2.4 billion spent on consumer
advertising pales in comparison to the more than $8 billion spent each
year on marketing to physicians. Physicians "hold the keys to the
pharmaceutical kingdom" and are a critical contact for companies
seeking entree for new drugs or for new uses of existing prescription
drugs.6 The importance of physician contact is evident in statistics
provided by the American Medical Association (AMA). According to
AMA data, for example, there is one industry representative for every 4.7
physicians and the average physician sees about ten pharmaceutical
representatives each month.7 The AMA data indicates that doctors, who
have little time in their busy schedules for sales pitches, often spend less
than one minute with representatives who come to "call."8
Consequently, marketing teams may resort to a variety of techniques to
get a physician's ear.
Marketing to doctors takes many forms including promotional gifts,
fees for speaking engagements, and payment for participation in
continuing medical education (CME) programs. Some doctors respond
to such overtures while others are quick to recognize and dismiss
marketing endeavors. Aggressive marketing techniques, however, are
often disguised so that sales pitches reach even those doctors most
reluctant to entertain sales representatives. The interaction of
pharmaceutical companies and health care professionals raises legal and
ethical questions, as some tactics cross the line from aggressive or
creative to illegal marketing techniques. As the new Medicare bill
increases the government's responsibility to pay for prescription drugs, it
is no surprise that government agencies have scrutinized these practices,
with the goal of uncovering fraud and recouping losses attributed to
fraudulent activity. Such investigations may be sparked by information
provided by whistleblowers, usually employees within the
pharmaceutical industry, who bring evidence of suspect marketing
activity to the government's attention. Criminal investigations and civil
lawsuits relating to pharmaceutical marketing practices have led to guilty
pleas, settlements, the payment of substantial fines, and corporate
integrity agreements.9
www.nihcm.org/spending2000.pdf at 14 [hereinafter NIHCM Report].
5. See Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, America's Other Drug Problem, THE
NEW REPUBLIC 27, 34 (Dec. 16, 2002).
6. See CARL ELLIOTT, BETTER THAN WELL: AMERICAN MEDICINE MEETS THE
AMERICAN DREAM 120 (2003).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. Recent cases include the following: In 2004, Pfizer agreed to pay $430 million
and pled guilty to criminal charges involving the marketing of Neurontin. See David
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Off-label promotion of products is one marketing strategy that has
caught the attention of federal investigators. An off-label use is one
other than that for which the drug was FDA approved. If a company has
a product that is approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
it may seek off-label uses for that product in order to gain market share
without the expense and time demanded by the standard FDA approval
process. While doctors may legally prescribe a drug approved by the
FDA for unapproved or "off-label" uses, manufacturers are generally
prohibited from promoting such "off-label" usage.10 While some off-
label uses are scientifically valid and provide tremendous benefits to
patients, there is strong temptation for manufacturers to promote off-
label use of products purely for profit. Such off-label promotion exposes
the public to health risks and the pharmaceutical company to legal
liability.
In addition to safety and efficacy concerns, off-label promotion also
raises concerns about how limited resources of state and federal agencies
are tapped. For example, Medicaid spending on prescription drugs
tripled between 1990 and 1999 from $4.8 billion to $17 billion."
Because some off-label uses may not be eligible for reimbursement by
government programs, a marketing campaign that promotes off-label use
of a drug, with the knowledge that such prescriptions will be charged to a
government program such as Medicaid or Medicare, may lead to
allegations of fraudulent conduct by the pharmaceutical company.
1 2
Strategies instituted to attract physicians to prescribe for off-label use
Armstrong & Rachel Zimmerman, Pfizer to Settle Medicaid-Fraud Case, WALL ST. J.,
May 13, 2004, at A4.; AstraZeneca paid $355 million in 2003 "to resolve criminal and
civil liabilities in connection with its drug pricing and marketing practices with regard to
Zoladex," used in treatment of prostate cancer. Department of Justice, AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals LP Pleads Guilty to Healthcare Crime; Company Agrees to Pay $355
Million to Settle Charges, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/03 civ 371.htm; TAP
Pharmaceuticals paid $875 million in 2001. See Department of Justice, TAP
Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and Seven Others Charged with Health Care Crimes;
Company Agrees to Pay $875 million to Settle Charges, available at
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ.htm; Schering Plough pled guilty to fraud
for violating the Anti-Kickback Statute and paid $425 million in fines and to settle a
False Claims Act case. The United States Government and Medicaid recovered losses
resulting from the company's failure to report its true best price for the drug Claritin. See
Press Release, United States Attorney's Office, Schering-Plough to Pay $345 Million to
Resolve Criminal & Civil Cases, (July 30, 2004).
10. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001)
(recognizing that the FDA attempts to regulate "off-label" use "without directly
interfering with the practice of medicine"); James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA,
Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 71, 76 (1998) (citing examples of court decisions and FDA recognition of
the value of off-label use).
11. See NIHCM Report, supra note 4, at 4.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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may also violate the Medicaid and Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute
(AKS), implicating both the pharmaceutical company and physicians.13
The FDA has power to regulate the marketing practices of
pharmaceutical companies and the Department of Justice may bring
criminal charges under the AKS. While the administrative and criminal
processes may have grave consequences for pharmaceutical companies,
the False Claims Act (FCA) 14 may be a more powerful weapon and
deterrent for unlawful marketing strategies. Fraudulent marketing
schemes may come to light through policing by the FDA as well as
through investigations by the Department of Justice. The FCA, however,
allows an individual who has knowledge of fraudulent activity to bring
suit on behalf of the government. Employees at pharmaceutical
companies, such as sales representatives or executives, may become
whistleblowers who provide valuable information to the government,
leading to guilty pleas and settlement of civil allegations of fraudulent
activity. The successful case brought under the FCA will recoup losses
sustained by the government and reward the whistleblower with a
percentage of the government's recovery.
Health care fraud is combated on several fronts, including industry
regulation, guidance, and litigation, which all contribute to monitoring
and shaping health care law. 15  Thus, the law regarding off-label
promotion of drugs is subject to federal legislation, as well as to industry
guidance and precedent from litigation. The Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the AKS and the FCA all play important roles in
regulating off-label promotion. The interpretation of these laws by the
courts also plays an important role in determining how pharmaceutical
companies may conduct their marketing affairs. Finally, guidance issued
by the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector
General (OIG), as well as industry guidelines promulgated by the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and the American
Medical Association (AMA), provide valuable and practical information
to the industry and physicians.'
6
This paper will explain the current law on off-label promotion of
pharmaceutical products. Part II of the paper will explain the FDA's role
in regulating off-label promotion, including why such regulation is
13. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
14. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 etseq.
15. See Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 243 (2004) (maintaining that "the combination of
cumbersome rulemaking procedures, the proliferation of unofficial forms of guidance,
and the growing use of litigation as a regulatory strategy has created an increasingly
untenable situation for the health care industry"). Id.
16. See discussion infra Part VI.
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necessary. Part III discusses FDA guidance and its codification in the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) regarding
specific limits to the dissemination of material regarding off-label
promotion as well as CME information on off-label promotion. The First
Amendment challenge to the FDA guidance and FDAMA are explored to
illustrate that, despite an apparent victory on First Amendment grounds,
the litigation did little to broaden the potential for increased off-label
promotion. In Part IV, the paper explains how the FCA and AKS can be
used to investigate and punish companies that unlawfully promote off-
label use of drugs. In Part V, United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-
Davis17 serves as a vivid example of a marketing campaign that
successfully increased the off-label use and raised the profit of a product
through off-label promotion, but was ultimately exposed as unlawful by
a whistleblower. Part VI synthesizes the various codes promulgated by
the OIG, PhRMA, and the AMA regarding appropriate interaction
between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry, especially as these
codes and guidelines relate to off-label promotion of pharmaceuticals.
The paper concludes that increased government scrutiny of marketing
practices in the health care industry should alert companies to educate
their employees about laws that could have serious legal repercussions
for unlawful marketing strategies. Furthermore, pharmaceutical
companies should implement meaningful policies and procedures that
assure that marketing strategies comply with the law and the guidelines
issued by both the industry and government.
II. FDA Regulation of Off-Label Promotion
FDA regulations provide that "a new drug may not be approved for
marketing unless it has been shown to be safe and effective for its
intended use(s)."'18 FDA approval is use specific and the labeling that
accompanies the product must accurately reflect its approved use.' 9 An
17. No. CIV.A.96-11651-PBS, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 (D. Mass. Aug. 22,
2003).
18. 21 C.F.R. § 3 10.303(a) (2003). The FDCA states that new pharmaceutical drugs
cannot be distributed in interstate commerce unless the sponsor of the drug demonstrates
to the FDA that the drug is safe and effective for each of its intended uses. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(a) & (d) (2005).
19. The package insert that accompanies the drug is the most obvious "labeling."
The FDA has also considered any promotional printed material related to the product as
labeling. See 21 C.F. R. § 202.1 (1997); see also Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345,
350 (1948) (pamphlets shipped prior to or subsequent to the shipment of the drug
considered "labeling" in determining misbranding); United States v. Vitamin Indus., Inc.,
130 F. Supp. 755, 765-66 (D. Neb. 1955) (display posters that described the use of the
drug shipped separately from the drug were considered labeling); Wash. Legal Found. v.
Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D. D.C. 1998) (stating that in addition to package
inserts that accompany the drug, labeling "has also been construed to include nearly
2005]
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off-label use is one other than that for which the drug was FDA
approved. It is unlawful for a manufacturer to introduce a drug into
interstate commerce with the intent that it be used for an off-label
purpose.2° A company that includes information about off-label uses in
its labeling information has committed the criminal offense of
"misbranding."
21
The FDA has the power to seize drugs that are introduced into
interstate commerce without agency approval.22 The FDA may also
issue injunctions against the unlawful promotion of drugs23 and it may
seek criminal penalties for off-label marketing.24 There is, however, no
private right of action to enforce these FDA regulations.
While the FDA regulates the promotion of off-label uses, it does not
control off-label prescription by physicians. The legislation specifically
states that it will not "limit or interfere with the authority of a health care
practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a
patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care
practitioner-patient relationship. 25 Thus, "once a drug product has been
approved for marketing, a physician may prescribe it for uses or in
treatment regimens of patient populations that are not included in
approved labeling., 26 Off-label prescription of drugs is common, with as
many as forty percent of all prescriptions issued involving off-label use.27
Moreover, in many cases, off-label drug prescription may represent the
standard of care in the industry.28
every form of drug company promotional activity, including booklets, pamphlets, mailing
pieces, bulletins, and all literature that supplements, explains, or is otherwise textually
related to the product.") Id.
20. 21 U.S.C. § 331(d).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) & § 352. In 1999, Genentech pleaded guilty to introduction
of a misbranded drug in interstate commerce, paying over $50 million in criminal fines.
The company promoted its FDA approved drug Protropin for short stature in healthy
children, as well as for other off-label uses. Thus, Genentech introduced its product
Protropin into interstate commerce intending it to be used for medical conditions for
which it had not been approved and had not been shown to be safe and effective. See
Vita Maria Salvemini, Idiopathic Short Stature or Just Plain Short: Why the Federal
Government Should Regulate the Administration of Human Growth Hormone to Healthy
Children, 38 GA. L. REv. 1105, 1120 (2003-04).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (2005).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) (2005).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2005).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2005).
26. Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Policy on
Promotion of Unapproved Drugs and Devices; Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg.
59,820, 59,821 (Nov. 18, 2004).
27. See David Armstrong & Anna Wilde Mathews, More Off-Label Drug Use is
Seen, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2004, at B1.
28. See, e.g., Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Policy
on Promotion of Unapproved Drugs and Devices; Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg.
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The primary benefit of off-label promotion is to inform the health
care community about scientific advances that will benefit patients, thus
improving the quality of health care without waiting for the lengthy FDA
approval process. 29  While the practice of prescribing off-label is
widespread, it has been especially prevalent and noteworthy in treating
cancer and HIV/AIDS.3 ° Other well-known, examples of prescriptions
for off-label use include the prescription of aspirin to reduce the risk of
heart attacks and the use of Viagra, originally approved to treat chest
pain, as an impotency drug.
Despite the successes of some off-label prescription and use, off-
label promotion by the pharmaceutical industry raises concerns about
public health and safety. While off-label promotion of some products
may improve the quality of health care and save lives, the promotion of
other products for off-label use may harm or endanger patients.
Professor Steven Salbu's analysis, contrasting the positive off-label
experience of breakthroughs in HIV/AIDS treatment with the negative
experience of off-label promotion of the diet drug phen-fen, illustrates
the cost/benefit issues associated with off-label promotion.31 Phen-fen
was prescribed and used widely for off-label uses despite the fact that the
combination of fenfluramine and phentermine was not approved. In
addition, the drug was used for time periods that exceeded those
approved by the FDA, and the drug was prescribed to patients who did
not meet the medical definition of obesity.32  Widespread off-label
prescription of phen-fen led to reports of heart valve damage in many
patients. The risks posed to the public from off-label prescription such
as that involving phen-fen has led some critics of off-label use to equate
the practice with dangerous medical experimentation. Even in cases
where an off-label use does not produce harmful side effects, harm may
result from the fact that an ineffective prescription has been substituted
for an effective drug.33
59,820, 59,821 (Nov. 18, 2004); see also Beck & Azari supra note 10, at 79.
29. See generally Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of
FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L.
REv. 181, 193-201 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu I]; James O'Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label
or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-
Approved Drugs, 12 ANN. HEALTH L. 295, 302-05 (2003); Edmund Polubinski, III, Note,
Closing the Channels of Communication: A First Amendment Analysis of the FDA's
Policy on Manufacturer Promotion of "Off-Label" Use, 83 VA. L. REV. 991, 1005
(1997).
30. Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate Levels
of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, Aids, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93, 96.
(1999) [hereinafter Salbu II].
31. See id. at 107-36.
32. See id. at 136.
33. See Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56-57 (D.
2005]
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Proponents of off-label marketing also maintain that avoiding the
lengthy and expensive FDA approval process has cost containment
benefits, both in terms of controlling price increases and in saving tax
dollars channeled to FDA efforts.34 This financial cost argument,
however, must be balanced with the FDA's underlying mission of
ensuring the safety and efficacy of products. The concern is that off-
label promotion may be motivated by profit maximization. For example,
manufacturers who are under pressure to maximize profits before patents
expire, or who are searching to expand the market for an approved drug,
may seek to market a product for a new use by bypassing the formal
FDA approval process and its costs.
The FDA has struggled with its role in controlling off-label
promotion of drugs to health care providers. Before 1997, off-label
marketing was prohibited. Under pressure by the industry to liberalize
its rules about off-label promotion, the FDAMA was passed in 1997 to
allow manufacturers to disseminate information about off-label uses to
health care providers under certain circumstances. 35 The dissemination
of such information is controversial, however, and the impact of the 1997
amendments is still unclear. The FDAMA and the lawsuits that tested
the limits of this act are discussed in the following section.
III. Defining the Scope of Off-Label Promotion
While recognizing a physician's right to prescribe any FDA
approved drug for off-label use, the FDA has resisted and generally
condemned efforts by pharmaceutical manufacturers to disseminate
information about off-label uses to health care professionals. The agency
has two reasons for discouraging the dissemination of such information.
First, the FDA worries that information provided by the pharmaceutical
companies may be incomplete, so that doctors are not fully informed in
making prescription choices. As one court pointed out, even truthful
information may be misleading where a manufacturer provides
physicians with "'the one' article that supports use of their drug, even if
there exists considerable evidence to the contrary., 36 Second, the FDA
worries that allowing the dissemination of information about off-label
D.C. 1998) [hereinafter WLFI].
34. See Salbu I supra note 29, at 195. A new trend in the pharmaceutical industry
hopes to reduce the substantial costs associated with drug development, and especially
the tremendous costs associated with late failures. "Experimental medicine," involves
small-scale trials on humans, rather than animals, before launching the expensive and
time consuming full-scale clinical trials. Such experimental medicine could change the
traditional pattern of drug testing. See Andrew Pollack, In Drug Research, Some Guinea
Pigs are Now Human, THE N.Y. TIMEs, August 4, 2004, at Al.
35. See 21 C.F.R. § 99.1-.501 (2003).
36. WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
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uses will encourage companies to bypass the FDA regulatory process.
Before FDAMA, a pharmaceutical company could market, promote
and advertise only those uses that the FDA determined to be safe and
effective for a particular drug. Thus, for many years, the FDCA
expressly forbade the sale of a drug whose labeling or advertising claims
of effectiveness had not yet received approval from the FDA.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers could not discuss off-label uses with
health care professionals nor could they distribute written materials that
mentioned off-label uses. The FDA allowed the dissemination of
information about off-label uses only when such information was
solicited by the physician.
A. The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
The FDA's first steps in allowing controlled dissemination of
iniormation about off-label uses came in the form of guidance
documents.37 Recognizing the importance of scientific and educational
discussions, "including discussions of unapproved uses," the FDA
published Guidance allowing manufacturers to disseminate information
to health care providers under certain conditions. 38  FDA Guidance
addressed the dissemination of journal article reprints and textbooks, so-
called "enduring materials," to physicians. In general, the FDA stated
that manufacturers should distribute enduring materials to health care
professionals only if the materials were unabridged and were primarily
39about approved FDA uses.
The FDA also issued Guidance concerning a manufacturer's
involvement in continuing medical education (CME) seminars at which
off-label uses were presented. The Guidance encouraged the exchange
of educational discussions "including discussions of unapproved uses. ' 4°
But the CME Guidance also sought to distinguish between CME
programs in which the content was independent of the influence of a
pharmaceutical company from those controlled by a pharmaceutical
company.41 The FDA's CME Guidance provided a list of twelve factors
to determine whether a program is independent of manufacturer
influence and, therefore, permissible.42
37. See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities,
62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997); Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg.
52,800 (Oct. 8, 1996).
38. See WLFI, 13 F, Supp. 2d at 57.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. (citing 62 Fed. Reg. 64074, 64095-99 (Dec. 3, 1997)).
42. See id. The twelve factors include who controls the content and selects the
presenters and the moderator; whether there is meaningful disclosure as to the company's
2005]
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The Guidance on enduring materials was subsequently passed in
1997, as section 401 of FDAMA.43 Many provisions in FDAMA modify
the regulation of approval for medical products, streamlining the process
to make promising drugs available more quickly. 4  While many of
FDAMA's reforms were popular, section 401's provisions regarding the
dissemination of information on off-label uses provoked controversy.
FDAMA was a compromise between those who believed that off-label
promotion would allow the public access to potentially life-saving
treatments and those who believed that off-label promotion and use of
drugs posed a threat to public health.45 Although FDAMA liberalizes
regulation of the drug industry in general, and purports to liberalize the
dissemination of information regarding off-label use to health care
professionals, the requirements for legally disseminating such
information are burdensome. The law requires the manufacturer to
submit a supplemental application to the FDA seeking approval of the
off-label use within thirty-six months of dissemination of the material in
question; to provide the materials to the FDA sixty days prior to
dissemination; to disseminate materials in unabridged form; and to
disclose to recipients that the materials pertain to an unapproved use of
the drug.46 The law also requires extensive reporting and recordkeeping
regarding the off-label use subsequent to dissemination of such
information.
B. Washington Legal Foundation Challenges Restrictions on Off-Label
Promotion
Before FDAMA was signed into law, the Washington Legal
Foundation (WLF), a national public interest center,47 challenged the
funding; whether unapproved uses will be discussed; whether the central theme of the
program is on one product; the relationship between supporting companies and the CME
provider; audience selection; opportunities for meaningful discussion and questioning;
dissemination of information; ancillary promotional activities; and complaints by the
provider, presenters or attendees regarding attempts by the supporting company to
influence content. See Final Guidance on Indus. Supported Scientific Ed. Activities, 62
Fed. Reg. 64074, 64097-99 (Dec. 3, 1997).
43. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296.
44. Some important reforms include the reauthorization of the Prescription Drug
User Fee Act of 1992 for five more years. This provision substantially increased the
number of employees at the FDA, by assessing user fees to the pharmaceutical industry.
The reform allowed the agency to reduce the average time for drug review from thirty to
fifteen months. FDAMA also codifies FDA regulations to increase patient access to
experimental drugs and medical devices.
45. See O'Reilly & Dalal, supra note 29, at 302-03.
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(a) (2005).
47. See WLF MISSION, at http://www.wlf.org/Resources/WLFmission (last visited
May 23, 2005).
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constitutionality of the FDA Guidance that preceded FDAMA regarding
enduring materials and CMEs. WLF sought to prevent the FDA from
restricting a manufacturer's promotion of off-label uses, by arguing that
the restrictions violate free speech provisions of the First Amendment.48
In Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman (WLF /),49 the court held
that the Guidances regarding enduring materials and CME Guidances
restricted speech more than necessary. 50
In WLF I, the court recognized that scientific and academic
materials merit constitutional protection as "commercial speech" when
the goal of disseminating such materials is to "increase the sales volume
of their drugs." 51 Because the speech in question was commercial, the
court applied the analysis outlined by the United States Supreme Court in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New
York.52 The four point Central Hudson analysis considers: 1) whether
the speech is inherently unlawful or misleading; 2) whether the
government has a substantial interest in regulating the speech; 3) whether
the government regulation directly advances the government interest; and
4) whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary to advance
the government's interest.5 3  In WLF I, the court held that the
possibilities for abuse in disseminating information do not make such
information "inherently misleading" or illegal.54 While the court
recognized the government's interest in regulating off-label promotion of
drugs to protect the public health, the court found that the Guidances in
question were more restrictive of speech than necessary, thereby
violating the Central Hudson test. 5 The court held that the FDA could
not prohibit manufacturers from disseminating enduring materials
"regardless of whether such [materials] include a significant or exclusive
focus on off-label uses and from proscribing manufacturers from
suggesting content to CME program providers. 56  The court's order
recognized that the FDA could continue to enforce rules and regulations
regarding the dissemination of information that was "false or
misleading" and that the FDA could require manufacturers to make
disclosures about their financial support or involvement in any of the
disseminated materials.57
48. WLF/, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 65-74.
51. Id. at 62-64.
52. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
53. Id. at 561-566.
54. WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
55. Id. at 65-74.
56. Id. at 74-75.
57. Id. at 75-76.
2005]
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When FDAMA was passed in 1997, the WLF challenged its
provisions on the same grounds that it had challenged the preceding FDA
Guidances.58 In Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney (WLF I1), the
court held that the provisions of FDAMA, like the FDA Guidance
provisions it had previously analyzed, are unconstitutional and infringe
on manufacturers' rights to disseminate information about off-label use.59
The court was particularly concerned about the requirements for
supplemental applications, stating "the supplemental application
requirement of the act amounts to a kind of constitutional blackmail-
comply with the statute or sacrifice your First Amendment rights. 60
On appeal, the FDA maintained that the section 401 provisions of
FDAMA merely provided a "safe harbor" and that neither the FDAMA
nor the CME Guidance authorizes the FDA to prohibit or sanction
speech. 61 The FDA's position that FDAMA and the CME Guidance
were merely official FDA interpretations eliminated the controversy
about the constitutionality of FDAMA, leading the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to vacate the injunction
of the lower court.62
With the district court's orders enjoining the FDA from enforcing
provisions of FDAMA vacated, the WLF sought to clarify its position
and the status of the court's order.63 In Washington Legal Foundation v.
Henney (WLF IV), the district court lamented that "after six years' worth
of briefs, motions, opinions, Congressional acts, and more opinions, the
issue remains 100% unresolved" leaving drug manufacturers "still
without clear guidance as to their permissible conduct. 64
C. Impact of the WLF Litigation
Despite the court's pessimistic view of the WLF litigation, the
decisions provide some parameters to guide both the FDA and
pharmaceutical manufacturers about promoting off-label use. The WLF
decisions indicate that manufacturers may disseminate scientific
publications concerning the off-label use of their products as well as
support CME programs for doctors. In fact, based on WLF,
manufacturers are permitted not only to provide financial support for
58. Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 82 (D. D.C. 1999).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 87.
61. Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter WLF I11].
62. Id. at 335.
63. Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 128 F. Supp. 2d 11, 12 (D. D.C. 2000)
[hereinafter WLF IV].
64. Id. at 15.
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CME programs that discuss off-label uses but they may also suggest the
content or the speakers for the event. As the FDA itself suggested, the
requirements of FDAMA should be construed as a "safe harbor," so that
a manufacturer that complies with the statute's requirements, would be
safe from FDA prosecution for off-label promotion or misbranding.
Some commentators suggest that the WLF litigation indicates a
triumph of the First Amendment over FDA regulation, with important
regulatory implications. 65 But the First Amendment issues involved in
the WLF litigation are more likely to prove remarkable from an
academic rather than a practical point of view. While the courts' rulings
recognize First Amendment protection of off-label promotion as
commercial speech, such recognition does not expand the opportunity for
aggressive or creative marketing techniques, nor does it protect false and
misleading representations in marketing materials.
The "safe harbor" provisions of FDAMA survive as guideposts for
the pharmaceutical industry, but these requirements are so burdensome
that pharmaceutical companies are unlikely to comply with them. When
the goal of disseminating information on off-label use is to alert the
medical community to the discovery of exciting advances or
improvements in medical treatment and such information is based on
reliable scientific studies, manufacturers should feel comfortable
disseminating such information. The WLF litigation, however, does
nothing to protect the manufacturer from marketing campaigns that
involve false or misleading information. Although the litigation gave no
clear guidance regarding the dissemination of off-label materials,
voluntary codes promulgated by the AMA and the pharmaceutical
industry, as well as guidelines from the OIG, provide much clearer
information to pharmaceutical companies and health care professionals
about behavior that may lead to liability for off-label promotion.66 When
pharmaceutical companies engage in practices that might be unlawful,
the FCA and the AKS may be the basis for whistleblower lawsuits.
IV. Combatting Fraud in Off-Label Promotion
A. The False Claims Act
While the FDA can take administrative or criminal action against a
manufacturer for off-label promotion, the FCA may be a more immediate
65. See John Kamp, Daniel E. Troy, Elizabeth Alexander, FDA Marketing v. First
Amendment: Washington Legal Foundation Legal Challenges to Off-Label Policies May
Force Unprecedented Changes at FDA, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 555 (1999) (suggesting
that the WLF litigation will substantially influence the FDA's approach to marketing).
66. See discussion infra at Part VI.
2005]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
67threat to companies mounting aggressive marketing campaigns.
Although the FDCA does not provide any right for private enforcement
of its provisions, including off-label marketing, the FCA may fill this
gap. The statute "can be used to create liability where failure to abide by
a rule or regulation amounts to a material misrepresentation made to
,68obtain a government benefit." Thus, even though Congress did not
provide a cause of action for money damages against a manufacturer for
off-label promotion, an FCA claim may be brought to recover money
where the manufacturer has caused the government to pay a false
claim.69
The FCA is the primary tool for the United States Government to
combat fraud perpetrated upon it. 70  Characterized as a broad remedial
statute intended to reach all types of fraud that might result in financial
loss to the government, the statute imposes civil liability on any person
who knowingly presents a false or fraudulent claim to the government. 7 1
An individual may bring a "qui tam" suit,72 a suit on behalf of the United
67. The FDA may seize the drugs that are being illegally promoted or seek an
injunction to prohibit unlawful promotional activities. 21 U.S.C. § 332 (a) and § 334.
The FDA may also institute criminal proceedings for off-label marketing violations. 21
U.S.C. § 333(a).
68. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 51 (D. Mass.
2001).
69. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2005).
70. The FCA provides:
Any person who-
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim
for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
government... is liable to the United States Government for a civil
penalty..., plus three times the amount of damages which the
government sustained because of the act of that person....
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
71. See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232-233 (1968) (noting
Congress wrote the FCA expansively, meaning to "reach all types of fraud, without
qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Government"); see also Cook
County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003). The provisions of
the FCA are further defined as follows: A person acts "knowingly" if he has actual
knowledge of the information: acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information. No
specific intent to defraud is required. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (1994); see also DeeDee
Baba and Paul E. McGreal, Applying Coase To Qui Tam Actions against the States, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 87, 127 (2001). A claim is "any request or demand, whether under
a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or
other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the money or
property which is requested or demanded." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c).
72. The term "qui tam" comes from the expression "qui tam pro domino rege quam
pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which translates, "who as well for the king as for
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States Government, and participate in a percentage of any sum
recovered.73 The whistleblower or relator himself need not suffer injury
because the United States remains the real party in interest, and has
theoretically assigned its right to sue to the relator.74 Furthermore, the
relator need not have an adversarial relationship with the defendant, so
long as there is a "clearly defined adversarial relationship between the
government and the defendant., 75  Justifications for the qui tam
provisions of the FCA include: the need to provide private incentives to
expose fraudulent conduct; the unwillingness of some agencies to expose
fraud; and the limited enforcement resources available to the
government.76
Passed in 1863, the FCA has been subject to both praise and
criticism. The Act was a response to the profiteering actions of
"unscrupulous businessmen" who sold faulty rifles, ammunition, and
lame horses to the United States government during the Civil War.77
Although the FCA originally allowed any citizen with knowledge of
fraud against the government to bring suit in the name of the United
States and to receive a sizable portion of the recovery for his efforts,
abuse of this opportunity led to more narrow interpretations of the FCA
and eventually to amendments to curb parasitic lawsuits. The 1943
amendments denied recovery to relators who raised claims "based upon
evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or any
agency, officer or employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought"
even if the relator was the original source of the government's
information.78
In 1986, amendments to the FCA showed renewed appreciation for
himself sues in this matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004).
73. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2005).
74. See United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1213 (7th Cir.
1995).
75. See id. at 1213; see also United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 921 F.
Supp. 611, 627 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
76. See James Roy Moncus III, Note, The Marriage of the False Claims Act and the
Freedom of Information Act: Parasitic Potential or Positive Synergy?, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1549, 1550 (2002). The United States has a long history of private citizens participating
in public law enforcement. Following English law precedent, the Continental Congress
included qui tam provisions in ten of the fourteen penal statutes enacted. See United
States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 (C.D. Cal.
1989). The landmark case, McCulloch v. Maryland, was a qui tam action, in which a
relator sued on his own behalf as well as for the state of Maryland to collect taxes levied
on the Second Bank of the United States. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
77. See 132 CONG. REc. 22, 335 (1986); see also Robert Fabrikant and Glenn E.
Solomon, Application of the Federal False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues
in the Health Care Industry, 51 ALA. L. REv. 105, 107 (1999) (tracing the origins and
development of the FCA and qui tam provisions).
78. See id. at 107.
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the value of the relator in exposing fraud on the government. The 1986
amendments recognize that the government may benefit from private
citizens pursuing cases of fraud without the investment of limited
government resources and that the relator may have knowledge of the
nexus between events and fraudulent acts. The 1986 amendments
increase the scope of qui tam suits in several ways. The amendments
allow the relator to be a party to the action even if the government
chooses to intervene in the action, while also allowing the relator to
pursue his suit if the government declines to intervene.79 They provide
the relator with a minimum recovery of 15 percent and a maximum of 25
percent if the government intervenes and a minimum of 25 percent and a
maximum of 30 percent if the government does not intervene."0 After
reviewing the relator's information, which must be submitted under seal,
the government also has the power to dismiss the suit.
81
Provisions in the 1986 amendments that give whistleblowers
opportunity, incentive, and protection, have produced results for the
federal government. The statute provides for civil penalties of $5,500 to
$11,000 per claim, plus three times the amount of damages sustained by
82the government. One source reports that FCA suits involving civil
health care fraud instituted by whistleblowers have resulted in recovery
of some $5.26 billion by the government during the period from 1999-
2003.83
B. The Anti-Kickback Statute
The AKS prohibits payments in any form, direct or indirect, made
purposefully to induce or reward the referral or generation of federal
health care business.84 Although there is no private right of action under
79. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4), (c)(3) (2000).
80. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) & (2).
81. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) & (2).
82. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000); 28 C.F.R. 85.3(a)(9) (2003) (increasing penalties by
10 percent).
83. See TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAuD, at http:www.taf.org (last visited May 23,
2005).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b. The Statute provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash
or in kind-
(A) in return for referring a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, or arranging for or recommending
purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health
care program, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall
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the AKS, the FCA has been used successfully as a vehicle for
whistleblowers to bring claims of fraud based on AKS violations. Courts
have consistently held that actions that violate the AKS may serve as a
basis for liability under the FCA.85 Several courts have held that a false
implied certification may be the basis for a false claim in the context of
the FCA, or that non-compliance with laws and regulations render
submitted claims "false" for purposes of the FCA.86
A recent case illustrates how courts view the AKS as the basis for a
claim under the FCA. In United States ex rel. Bidani v. Lewis, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reasoned
that compliance with the AKS is crucial to the government's treatment of
claims for reimbursement under federal health care programs.87 Because
the AKS criminalizes receiving remuneration intended to affect decisions
to purchase products for which payment may be made under Medicare or
Medicaid and those convicted under the AKS are barred from
88participating in the federal health care program, reimbursing a claimant
for such purchases would "put the government in the position of funding
be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both.
Id.
85. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA, 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir.
1997); U.S. ex rel. Barrett v. Columbia/HCA, 217 F. Supp. 2d 28, 29 (D. D.C. 2003)
(holding that a violation of AKS can give rise to an FCA claim): U.S. ex rel. Bidani v.
Lewis, 264 F. Supp. 2d 612, 613 (N.D. Ill. 2003); U.S. ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes
Treatment Centers of America, 238 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D. D.C. 2002). The government has
also twice obtained consent decrees enjoining companies from submitting claims to
Medicare or Medicaid for patients referred pursuant to a kickback scheme. The
defendants paid significant sums to resolve their FCA liability. See Shalala v. Radiation
Care, No. 1:94-CV-3339-RCF, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 749 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Shalala v.
T2 Medical, No. 1-94-CV-2549-ODE, 1994 WL 686949 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
86. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Services., Inc., 289
F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2002); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding
that claimants of Medicare reimbursement implicitly certify that they have complied with
statutes or regulations that expressly require compliance as a prerequisite to Medicare
payments); Pogue, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 266 (D. D.C. 2002) (affirming earlier holding that
Medicare claimants impliedly certify compliance with AKS, stating that the "developing
law has supported [the court's] finding that violations of Anti-Kickback and Stark laws
can support a claim under the False Claim Act."); United States ex rel. Roy v. Anthony,
914 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl.
429 (1994), aff'd, 57 F. 3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995); United States v. Incorp. Village of
Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Raymond &
Whitcomb Co., 53 F. Supp. 2d 436, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that submission of a
false claim by a participant in a venture extends that false claim to all parties).
87. 264 F. Supp. 2d 612 (D. Ill. 2003)
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (criminalizing receiving remuneration intended to
affect decisions to purchase supplies for which payment may be made under Medicare);
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(1) (barring those convicted under the AKS from participating in
the federal health care program).
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illegal kickbacks after the fact." 89 Consequently, the court upheld the
AKS as a basis for a claim under the FCA. Similarly, other courts have
held that where the government pays funds to a party, and would not
have paid those funds had it known of a violation of a law or regulation,
the claim submitted for those funds contained an implied certification of
compliance with the law or regulation and was fraudulent. 90 Although
some courts have expressed reservations about the implied certification
theory as a basis for FCA actions, they have not expressly rejected the
theory. 91
The case described in the following section illustrates how the FCA
and the AKS may be used to combat unlawful off-label promotion of
pharmaceuticals.
V. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis: Off-Label
Marketing and the FCA
A. Background
United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis92 involved claims of
fraud and deception brought by a former employee of Parke-Davis.93
89. Bidani, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
90. See Ab- Tech Constr., Inc., 31 Fed. C1. at 434
91. In United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Science & Engineering, Inc., 214
F.3d 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the court held that the relator did not have a sufficient claim
of implied certification, but the court did not discredit the theory of implied certification.
In United States ex rel. Barmak v. Sutter Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8509 (S.D.N.Y.
May 14, 2002), the court held that it was "not convinced that a qui tam plaintiff can use
the FCA as a vehicle for pursuing a violation of the anti-kickback statute in this circuit."
Id. The court rejected implied certification but did so in dicta on a matter not fully
briefed and not squarely before it. The court rejected the relator's claim for failure to
establish a causal connection between the alleged kickback violations and claims for
reimbursement, failure to allege certification of compliance with the anti-kickback
statute, and failure to allege that the government relied on such certification to make
payments. Id. In Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 787 n.8
(4th Cir. 1999), the court expressed some doubts about the implied certification theory,
but did not directly address the issue. See generally Lisa Michelle Phelps, Note, Calling
Off the Bounty Hunters: Discrediting the Use of Alleged Anti-Kickback Violations to
Support Civil False Claims Actions, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1003 (maintaining that violation
of the AKS does not render a claim "false" because the violation does not cause the
government injury and that the FCA should not be used as a means for enforcing the
AKS because congressional intent indicates that only the federal government, not qui tam
plaintiffs, could enforce the AKS).
92. 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001).
93. Pfizer, the world's largest pharmaceutical company, acquired Warner Lambert,
including its pharmaceutical division, Parke-Davis. The activities involved in the lawsuit
occurred before Pfizer's acquisition. Parke-Davis, Warner-Lambert and Pfizer were
named as defendants in the case. This paper will refer to all of the defendants
collectively as Parke-Davis.
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The relator maintained that the defendant, Parke-Davis, defrauded the
United States Government by engaging in a marketing campaign that
caused physicians to write off-label prescriptions of its product,
Neurontin to patients, and then required Medicaid to reimburse the health
care providers for such prescriptions. The FCA claim is based on the
fact that the defendants promoted the drug product for uses not approved
by the FDA, resulting in federal reimbursement payments for Neurontin
prescriptions that were ineligible under Medicaid.
David Franklin, the relator, holds a doctorate degree in biology and
was hired by Parke-Davis as a medical liaison in 1996. Franklin
maintains that during the four months he was employed by Parke-Davis,
he and other medical liaisons were trained to promote various off-label
uses of Neurontin by giving physicians false information about the safety
and efficacy of off-label uses.94 For example, Franklin revealed that
medical liaisons were trained to mislead doctors to believe that a body of
data existed to support the use of Neurontin in treating a variety of
conditions, including bipolar disease and attention deficit disorder, when
no such data existed. Furthermore, these medical liaisons led doctors to
believe that clinical trials supported the safety and efficacy of such off-
label uses. Frankin also maintains that he and other medical liaisons
were trained to pose as research personnel and medical doctors, rather
than as sales representatives, to gain the trust of the physicians they
visited.
The product, Neurontin, the brand name for the drug gabapentin,
was approved by the FDA in 1994 as a treatment to be used in
conjunction with other drugs for controlling epilepsy, at approved
dosages ranging from 900 to 1800 mg per day.95 According to Franklin,
during his four month tenure with Parke-Davis, Neurontin was promoted
for a variety of uses, including pain control, attention deficit disorder,
and bipolar disease, even though there was no scientific evidence to
demonstrate that Neurontin was effective for such indications.96 Despite
the lack of evidence to support claims that Neurontin was effective in
treating a variety of disorders and conditions, Franklin alleged that the
company engaged in a deliberate marketing strategy to expand the off-
label prescription of Neurontin in lucrative markets such as pain
management and psychiatric uses.
Confidential internal documents and taped voicemail messages
indicate the scope of the company's deliberate attempt to promote off-
label uses, without regard for the public's health and safety. One senior




PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
executive, explaining the "Neurontin push," rallied his sales
representatives with the following speech: "I want you out there every
day selling Neurontin... holding their hand, whispering in their ear-
Neurontin for pain, Neurontin for monotherapy, Neurontin for bipolar,
Neurontin for everything.... I don't want to see a single patient coming
off Neurontin before they've been up to at least 4,800 milligrams a
day."97
Franklin also alleged that doctors who prescribed large amounts of
Neurontin received kickbacks in the form of cash payments, travel
benefits, and Olympic tickets.98 Payments were sometimes disguised as
remuneration for consulting services or participation in studies.99
The success of the off-label marketing campaign is evident from its
results, as specific off-label usage always increased dramatically shortly
after an organized promotion effort. For example, one calendar quarter
after the campaign started, pain uses of the product increased 2500
percent, and in the second quarter of 1996, within three months after the
program to promote migraine use began, usage increased 800 percent.
When the defendant initiated its off-label marketing campaigns in late
1995, off-label uses for Neurontin were less than 15 percent of its sales.
In 2003, use of Neurontin for unapproved uses accounted for nearly 90
percent of its sales. 00 Moreover, while Parke-Davis initially estimated
the lifetime sales of Neurontin at $500 million, the drug has grossed
over $2 billion annually in the last several years.
B. Applying the FCA
The basis for the FCA action in this case was that the defendant,
Parke-Davis, engaged in a scheme of fraud that caused doctors to write
prescriptions for a variety of off-label uses of the product, a substantial
number of which were reimbursed by Medicaid. The relator maintains
that the product was not eligible for reimbursement from Medicaid when
prescribed for an off-label use because its off-label uses were not
included in any of the compendia as required by federal law.'0 ' The
court recognized a viable cause of action because of evidence that the
defendant engaged in "an unlawful course of fraudulent conduct
including knowingly making false statements to doctors that caused them
to submit claims that were not eligible for payment by the government
97. "Drug Giant Accused of False Claims," Dateline (NBC television broadcast,
July 11, 2003) (transcript on file with author).
98. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
99. Id.
100. See Anna Wilde Mathews & David Armstrong, Pfizer Case Signals Tougher
Action on Off-Label Drug Use, WALL ST. J. May 14, 2004, at B1.
101. See 42 U. S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i).
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under Medicaid."'
0 2
The kickback claims, regarding improper compensation to doctors
who increased their prescriptions of Neurontin, were dismissed early in
the litigation because they were not pleaded with sufficient
particularity. 10 3  This left the plaintiff with the task of making an
appropriate case under the FCA based on the allegation that the
defendant's off-label promotion of its product caused ineligible claims to
be submitted for Medicaid reimbursement.
In denying a motion for summary judgment for the defendants, the
Massachusetts District Court made several important interpretations
about the FCA and its application to off-label promotion. 10 4  Most
significantly, the court concluded that even "truthful off-label marketing"
may be the basis for a cause of action under the FCA.10 5 The court
reached this conclusion by recognizing critical distinctions in the
requirements of sections 3729(a)(l)-(2) of the FCA.
The defendant argued that the FCA has a "double falsehood"
requirement that the plaintiff failed to meet. Although the plaintiff
introduced many allegations of false statements made by the defendant in
its off-label marketing campaign, the defendant insisted that the plaintiff
had to prove "that Parke-Davis intentionally made a material false
statement that led to the filing of a false claim."'1 6 The court disagreed,
finding that section 3729(a)(1) of the FCA does not require the relator to
present evidence that false claims were the result of false statements. In
other words, the relator was not required to prove that statements made
to physicians about the product's safety or efficacy were false. The
statute, the court maintained, requires only that the defendant "causes to
be presented" a false claim for payment or approval. 10 7 While the court
recognized a double falsehood requirement under section 3729(a)(2), it
concluded that the language of section 3729(a)(1) clearly indicates
otherwise. 0 8  The court pointed to several other cases supporting its
interpretation that evidence of a false statement is not necessary under
section 3729(a)(1).109
102. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 52; cf., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1943) (stating that payments under government contract that was
executed as a result of collusive bid constituted actionable false claims).
103. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
104. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. CIV. 96-11651-PBS, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003).
105. See id. at *4.
106. See id. at *3.
107. See id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)).
108. See Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *4.
109. Id. at *3-4 ("FCA liability under 3729(a)(1) may arise even absent an affirmative
or express false statement" by the defendant.) (citing Shaw v. AAA Eng'g & Drafting,
Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 532 (10th Cir. 2000); United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp.,
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Recognizing that section 3729(a)(1) of the FCA does not have a
double falsehood requirement, the court answered what it had identified
in an earlier opinion as a distinction between unlawful off-label
marketing activity, such as a "mere technical violation of the FDA's
prohibition on off-label marketing," and "an unlawful course of
fraudulent conduct, which includes knowingly making false
statements."'1 0 According to the court's interpretation of the FCA, as
long as the defendant caused the false claim for ineligible Medicaid
reimbursement to be filed, the cause did not have to be fraudulent or
"otherwise independently unlawful." 1 '
A more difficult question for the court involved the extent to which
government programs cover off-label uses. The defendant, Parke-Davis,
maintained that forty-two state Medicaid programs permit
reimbursement for off-label, non-compendium drug prescriptions or
grant the states discretion to reimburse for off-label uses." 2 If states
have discretion in determining whether such claims are reimbursable,
then the submissions for reimbursement could not be considered "false"
claims.
113
The answer to this question hinges on interpretation of the Medicaid
statute provision, which states that "[a] State may exclude or otherwise
restrict coverage of a covered outpatient drug if-(i) the prescribed use is
not for a medically accepted indication."' 14 The defendant reads this
language to show that the states have discretion in whether or not to
reimburse for off-label uses. The relator, however, argues that the statute
provides discretion only for "covered outpatient drugs."'1 5 The court
found it unnecessary to decide the question for purposes of summary
judgment. Because eight states clearly do not allow discretion in
covering off-label uses, the court concluded that liability could be
premised on claims submitted in those eight states." 6
921 F. Supp. 611, 627 (D. Wis. 1995) (noting that a claim under section 2 requires an
"affirmative false statement" while a claim under section 1 does not).
110. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 52. As an example of a "mere technical
violation" the court noted that a sales representative might provide one doctor with
information of another doctor's experience with an off-label use. See id.
111. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *6.
112. Id. at *7.
113. See 42 U.S. C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(B).
114. Id.
115. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *8.
116. Id. at *9-10. While finding it unnecessary to answer the question regarding
state's discretion, the court appeared to criticize the relator's interpretation because it
violates rules of statutory construction by interpreting certain provisions of the statute to
be superfluous. See id. The court requested amicus briefs from federal officials to clarify
the extent to which states have discretion to provide coverage for off-label prescriptions.
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The defendant also raised lack of a causal connection between its
actions and the false claims as grounds for summary judgment.
According to the defendant, the involvement of the physicians broke the
chain of causation. 117 The court, however, found that the plaintiff had
sufficient evidence of causation to defeat the defendant's motion. Using
a common law tort analysis of causation, the court found that the plaintiff
had introduced enough circumstantial evidence to raise a question of fact
regarding causation in fact. Records that showed the differences in off-
label prescription rates before and after contact between the physicians
and Parke-Davis representatives, as well as market research reports that
recorded the doctors' state of mind after meetings with sales
representatives, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence, according to
the court. 18 The court did not require proof that individual doctors relied
on false statements by sales representatives.
The court recognized the oft-cited principle that an intervening
force breaks the causal connection only when such intervention is
unforeseeable." 9 The court noted that in this case, the participation of
physicians in the "submission of false Medicaid claims was not only
foreseeable, it was an intended consequence of the alleged scheme of
fraud."
120
The fact that the doctors actually submitted the claims for Medicaid
reimbursement does not alleviate the liability of the manufacturers who
caused such claims to be submitted. In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied on similar decisions that held defendants liable under the
FCA even though a third party had actually presented the false claim.
The court found the instant case similar to that in United States ex rel.
Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of America, in which doctors
received kickbacks for referring patients to various hospitals.12'
Although the hospitals submitted the claims for Medicare
reimbursement, the court in Pogue found that the doctors could be held
liable under the FCA for causing such false claims to be submitted.
22
Thus, an argument that a third party submitted the claims will not allow
the party who caused the claims to be submitted to escape liability under
the False Claims Act.
123
117. Id. at*12.
118. Id. at *13.
119. Id. at *14 (citing United States ex rel. Cantekin v. University of Pittsburgh, 192
F.3d 402, 416 (3rd Cir. 1999)); D. Dobbs et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 44 at 303-
04 (5th ed. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 443 (1965).
120. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *15.
121. 238 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D. D.C. 2002).
122. Id. at 267.
123. See id. at 266. Cf United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 2001)
(affirming FCA liability of owner/managing director of physical therapy clinic who
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The court did not fully consider the AKS as a basis for the FCA
claim in this case, but it recognized the viability of this theory and that
"recent case law supports implied-certification FCA claims in the
healthcare context, including kickback-based claims.... ,,24 The court
failed to consider the issue, however, because it was raised by the
government, and the government had not intervened as a party in the
case. 125
The court's conclusions about the viability of an FCA claim based
on off-label promotion undoubtedly contributed to the settlement of this
case. Within a year of the court's decision, the defendant agreed to plead
guilty to criminal wrongdoing and to pay $430 million in fines to settle
both criminal allegations and the FCA claims. The defendant also agreed
to sign a corporate integrity agreement that allows the government to
monitor its marketing practices. 1
26
In its promotion of off-label uses for Neurontin, Parke-Davis
engaged in activities that clearly violate the AKS. Although charges
based on allegations of such violations were not litigated in this case, a
review of recent guidelines by the government, the pharmaceutical
industry, and the medical profession indicate the extent of Parke-Davis'
misconduct.
VI. Appropriate Interaction Between Health Care Professionals and the
Pharmaceutical Industry
The convoluted trajectory of the Washington Legal Foundation
litigation left the pharmaceutical industry without clear guidance
regarding permissible off-label promotion. 2 7  Voluntary codes
established by the AMA and PhRMA, and guidance by the OIG, provide
more concrete guidance and address legal, ethical, and socially
responsible interaction between health care professionals and the
pharmaceutical industry. 128 Many of the provisions of the codes and
instructed the clinic's billing company to use an improper code on Medicare
reimbursement claim forms, stating, "[a] person need not be the one who actually
submitted the claim forms in order to be liable."); United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934,
935-37, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that when psychiatrist's wife submitted invalid
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement claims, "[the psychiatrist] is no less liable than
his wife for these false submissions").
124. Parke-Davis, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *19.
125. Id. at*19-20.
126. See David Armstrong, Pfizer to Settle Medicaid-Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., May
13, 2004, at A3.
127. See discussion supra at Part III.B.
128. American Medical Association Guidelines E-8.061 Gifts to Physicians from
Industry [hereinafter AMA Guidelines], available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/category/8484.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2005); PhRMA Code on Interactions
with Healthcare Professionals [hereinafter the PhRMA Code], adopted on April 18, 2002,
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guidance address interaction between healthcare professionals and
pharmaceutical manufacturers that is likely to arise in the context of off-
label promotion. The AMA, PhRMA, and the OIG all address specific
circumstances that might give rise to improper conduct, violation of the
AKS, and potential liability under the FCA.
According to the PhRMA Code and AMA Guidelines,
pharmaceutical manufacturers may offer, and physicians may accept,
educational and practice related items if they are primarily for the benefit
of the patient and if they are not of substantial value. 129 Items should be
valued at $100 or less and may include textbooks that serve a genuine
educational function or items of minimal value associated with a
healthcare professional's practice, such as pens, pencils, notepads, and
similar items. 30 Even the offer or acceptance of educational and practice
related items may be prohibited, however, if such items are offered on
more than an occasional basis.131 Items of substantial value, such as a
TV or VCR, items intended for the healthcare professional's personal
benefit such as artwork, music or tickets to a sporting event, and
payments of cash or gift certificates are not allowed. 32  The OIG
Guidance also cautions against interactions between physicians and
manufacturers that might implicate the AKS. 133 The OIG recommends
that relationships between manufacturers and physicians should be
structured to fall within safe harbors, such as those for personal services
and management contracts. 134 The OIG also specifically recommends
compliance with the PhRMA Code, noting that "compliance with the
PhRMA Code will not protect a manufacturer as a matter of law under
the anti-kickback statute," but that "it will substantially reduce the risk of
fraud and abuse and help demonstrate a good faith effort to comply with
the applicable federal health care program requirements.' 35
The OIG Guidance recognizes that physicians may accept
remuneration at fair market value for bona fide consulting or advisory
available at http://w-ww.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/19.04.2002.390.cfm
(revised Jan. 2004); Office of Inspector General, OIG Compliance Program Guidance for
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731 (May 5, 2003) [hereinafter OIG
Guidance].
129. PhRMA Code at 17; AMA Guidelines, at E-8.061(2).
130. Id.
131. PhRMA Code at 17.
132. PhRMA Code at 17; AMA Guidelines, at E-8.061(I).
133. OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,734. The OIG Guidance cautions that
"practices that may be common or longstanding in other businesses are not necessarily
acceptable or lawful when soliciting federal health care program business." The OIG
Guidance also cautions that "a violation of the anti-kickback statute may give rise to
liability under the False Claims Act." Id.
134. Id. (referring to 42 CFR 1001.952(d) and 42 CFR 1001.952(i), among others).
135. Id. at 23,737.
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services. 136 Nevertheless, in order to minimize the risk of investigation
for fraud and abuse, the OIG recommends that physicians and industry
representatives document the consulting arrangement, including the need
for such services, the nature of the services provided, and the
compensation to be provided.1
37
Both the OIG Guidance and the PhRMA Code recommend that
pharmaceutical manufacturers separate educational grant programs from
marketing and sales programs, and that they establish objective criteria
for awarding grants that do not take into account the volume of purchases
made by or anticipated from the grant recipient.' 38 Furthermore, all of
the guidelines emphasize that pharmaceutical manufacturers may not
condition funding of educational grants, scholarships, subsidies, or
support on the purchase of a product, in exchange for a healthcare
professional prescribing products, or for a commitment to continue
prescribing products.' 39 Although manufacturers may provide funding
for educational presentations, the guidelines provide that they should
have no control over the speaker or content of the presentation in these
forums. 1
40
Similarly, manufacturers may fund educational and research
programs such as CMEs, but they should not influence the content of the
program or seek to generate business through improper remuneration of
program participants. 14 1  Moreover, any financial support should be
given to the conference's or program's sponsor rather than to any one
healthcare professional, in order to reduce the overall conference fee for
all participants and to avoid the appearance of an inappropriate cash
gift. 1
42
According to the PhRMA Code and AMA Guidelines,
pharmaceutical companies may not provide financial support for a
healthcare professional's spouse or other guests to take part in
educational conferences or presentations. 143  Other provisions of the
PhRMA Code and AMA Guidelines specify that physicians should not
be compensated for time spent as "consultants" when they attend
educational meetings or conferences in a primarily passive capacity.""4
136. Id. at 23,738.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 23,735-36; PhRMA Code, supra note 128, at 15.




142. PhRMA Code, supra note 128, at 9; AMA Guidelines, supra note 128, at E-
8.061(4), (7).
143. Id.
144. PhRMA Code, supra note 128, at 9; AMA Guidelines, supra note 128, at E-
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Nor should such token consultants receive reimbursements for travel
expenses associated with conference attendance.145 The PhRMA Code
indicates that such conferences should be purely professional and that
entertainment or recreational activities should not be offered at such
programs. 
146
The circumstances under which a physician may accept
remuneration or other benefits from a manufacturer are specific and
limited. Manufacturers may offer reimbursement for reasonable travel,
meals and lodging expenses incurred in performance of bona fide
consulting or advisory services. 147  Occasional meals accompanying
informational discussions by industry representatives are also allowed so
long as they are modest and occur in a manner conducive to the
exchange of scientific information and provide educational value . 48 A
company may not, however, pay for a meal that will be eaten without a
company representative being present. 149
In addition to addressing questions about the behavior of health care
professionals and industry representatives, the OIG Draft Guidance urges
pharmaceutical companies to implement meaningful compliance
programs that include written standards of conduct. Companies should
also address specific areas of potential fraud and abuse such as price and
rebate reporting and sales and marketing practices. 50 The OIG Draft
Guidance also recommends that companies establish education programs
for employees as well as agents of the pharmaceutical companies; clear,
confidential channels of communication for reporting issues of non-




Pharmaceutical manufacturers should approach off-label promotion
with caution. Neither the provisions of FDAMA nor the rulings in the
8.061(5).
145. PhRMA Code, supra note 128, at 11; AMA Guidelines, at E-8.061(5).
146. PhRMA Code, supra note 128, at 7.
147. PhRMA Code, supra note 128, at 9; AMA Guidelines, at E-8.061(5).
148. PhRMA Code, supra note 128, at 7; AMA Guidelines, supra note 128, at E-
8.061(5).
149. PhRMA Code, supra note 128 at 7.
150. See OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,739-40.
151. Id. at 23,739-42. See also Press Release, Grassley Urges Drug Companies to
Inform Employees about False Claims Act, (July 30, 2004), available at:
http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2004/p04rO7-30a.htm. Senator Charles E. Grassley,
chairman of the Committee on Finance and author of the 1986 amendments to the FCA
wrote to several pharmaceutical companies, urging them to educate employees about the
FCA and to implement anti-fraud programs as outlined by the 01G.
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Washington Legal Foundation litigation increase the breadth of off-label
marketing opportunities or diminish the FDA's power to regulate and
enforce the dissemination of any information that is false or misleading.
Thus, the conclusion that off-label promotion merits First Amendment
protection is limited at best. The FDAMA's burdensome "safe harbor"
provisions may be overly restrictive, but manufacturers should observe at
least the spirit of these provisions when promoting off-label use.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers should be aware of the potential for
off-label promotion to trigger claims under the FCA. The trend is for
courts to interpret the FCA broadly, and to recognize the viability of
several theories of fraud. In fact, a Massachusetts court recently held
that even truthful off-label promotion could be grounds for a claim under
the FCA, if the pharmaceutical manufacturer was aware that its actions
would cause the submission of ineligible Medicaid claims. Courts are
also inclined to recognize FCA actions based on a theory of implied
certification of the AKS.
Increased government scrutiny of marketing practices in the
healthcare industry should encourage companies to educate their
employees about the implications of the AKS and the FCA. Employees
of pharmaceutical companies should be well trained to observe the
guidelines promulgated by PhRMA. Finally, manufacturers should
implement compliance programs as specified in the OIG's Draft
Guidance.
Most importantly, the law and industry guidelines must prevent
industry marketing efforts from interfering with the trustworthiness of
the medical profession. The FDA continues to play an important role in
monitoring off-label promotion and the interaction between the industry
and healthcare professionals. Physicians should have access to the most
recent information in order to provide the best care possible to their
patients. But doctors must be able to rely on the information they receive
from manufacturers, without suspicion that marketing goals are more
important than the delivery of safe and effective healthcare.
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